The Lebanese state is empowered and guarantees the security of all its citizens, residents and visitors on the entirety of its territory

The Lebanese state is empowered and guarantees the security of all its citizens, residents and visitors on the entirety of its territory

A Sovereign Diplomacy That Ensures Peace and Stability

1.Internal security, is the act of keeping peace within the borders of a sovereign state or other self-governing territories, generally by upholding the national law and defending against internal security threats. Responsibility for internal security may be placed on police to paramilitary forces, and in exceptional circumstances, the military itself

2.Threats to the general peace include low-level civil disorder, large scale violence and armed insurgency, serious organized crime, political unrest, and domestic terrorism

3.Foreign powers may also act as a threat to internal security by committing or sponsoring terrorism or rebellion, without actually declaring war

1.Number and size of armed non-state actors

2.Number and size of non-state zones

3.Prevalence of common crimes, including homicide, kidnapping, burglary and theft, armed robbery, and extortion

4.World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index (Factor 5: Order & Security)

1.In Lebanon, policing is done by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) who serve to maintain internal stability and neutrality between Lebanon’s often violent political and confessional groups while non-state actors also fulfill some policing in their zones of influence

2.Law enforcement and security in Lebanon is a grey area involving a confluence of actors that include state institutions, international actors and Hezbollah

3.There is internal fighting among non state actors, who also often protect various criminal activities

4.Crime rates have been rising rapidly since the onset of the multiple crises that hit Lebanon:

• Reached a six-year peak in 2020. In the first half of 2020, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) recorded 863 thefts and robberies as opposed to 650 for all 2019
• In Q1 2021, car theft cases rose by 8.8%, and there were 889 (162%) more thefts in Q1 2021 than in Q1 2020

5.Citizens and residents face significant challenges obtaining responsive, effective, efficient and accountable safety and security services from the ISF

6.The job of protecting Lebanon from external security threats is divided between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) and non-state actors

7.The presence of and interaction between the international actor (UNIFIL), the non-state resistance, and the state, have blurred the lines of security responsibilities

1.The Lebanese state does not have the monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force for law and security enforcement

2.Non-state actors have weapons, political clout, and popular support and resist all attempts by the state to disarm them

3.Some non-state actors have regional allegiances or are themselves constituted by non-Lebanese members

4.LAF have various informal sectarian and political allegiances

5.All of the above prevents LAF from effectively protecting borders and stopping the exponentially increasing smuggling of subsidized goods to Syria, and / or of illegal products from and to Syria

6.Traditional non-state tribal structures are difficult to dismantle

7.Lack of national cohesion forbids the Lebanese army from dismantling non-state armed groups on the ground

8.The on-going political crisis has perpetuated communal fears and has enabled sectarian militias to pursue security strategies

9.Political parties exploit peoples’ fear in order to justify their use of arms

10.The massive influx of Syrian refugees further complicates the LAF mission to maintain internal security

1.Law 17, Interior Security Forces organizing law (1990)

2.Some collaboration exists between non-state actors and LAF on specific issues

3.The power-sharing formula based on the maintenance of the status-quo among confessional elites is susceptible to civil strife in times of social mobilization (1958, 1975, and 2019)

4.The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) is the first tribunal of international character to prosecute terrorist crimes

5.The STL has "jurisdiction over persons responsible for the attack of 14 February 2005 resulting in the death of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri and in the death or injury of other persons" (Article 1, STL statute)

6.The STL also has jurisdiction over other attacks in Lebanon if it is proven that they are connected to the events of 14 February and are of similar nature and gravity

Policy Action

1.Ensure the independence of law enforcement

2.Modernize and reorganize all LAF

3.Strengthen and train the LAF so it has the power to protect Lebanon form external military threats and internal terrorist organizations and isolated terrorist actions

4.Remove all security zones

5.Make LAF control all borders

6.Make armed forces receive orders exclusively from the Lebanese government, and forbid any interference in their duties except in accordance with the law

7.Re-initiate the dialogue between the different Lebanese communities especially on issues pertaining to security, including the possession of arms, with the objective of:

• Re-establishing trust between communities and factions
• Disarming all non-state actors

8.Ensure the implementation of STL’s verdicts